

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.....	1
II. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE AREAS AND IN AFGHANISTAN.....	9
III. THE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: LOGISTICS, POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION.....	14
A. Physical and Demographic Considerations.....	14
B. Timing.....	16
C. International Coordination.....	18
D. Political Considerations.....	19
IV. HEALTH CARE ISSUES.....	24
A. For the Refugees in Pakistan...	33
B. Refugees en Route.....	34
C. After Resettlement.....	35
V. THE NEED FOR SUSTENANCE OF THE REFUGEE POPULATION.....	38
VI. SPECIAL ISSUES AFFECTING WOMEN.....	43
VII. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES....	46

VII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS.....	52
--------------------------------------	----

APPENDICES

1. MAPS OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE REFUGEE AREAS
2. THE GENEVA ACCORDS
3. MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMISSION
4. COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CENTER STUDY OF
REFUGEE HEALTH
5. SELECTED REFUGEE HEALTH STATISTICS
6. CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED TO DATE FOR
HUMANITARIAN AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
TO AFGHAN REFUGEES DURING RESETTLEMENT

- * This report was prepared by five participants in the Commission's fact-finding tour: Professor Tom Gouttierre, Lionel H. Olmer, Catherine O'Neill, Thomas L. Rhodes, and Dr. James C. Strickler. Three participants in the trip, Patrick Brizay and Alain Boinet of Solidarite Afghanistan in France, and Lord Cranborne of Afghan Aid in the U.K. as well as those Commission members who did not participate in the tour, have not had an opportunity to review this report; thus, they should not be held accountable for its contents.

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

At the urging of Mr. Leo Cherne, the Chairman of the International Rescue Committee ("IRC"), a Citizens Commission on Afghan Refugees (the "Commission") was created in May 1988 under the auspices of the IRC. The proximate cause for the establishment of the Commission was the signing on April 14, 1988 of the Geneva Accords (the "Accords"). The Accords include bilateral agreements on non-interference and non-intervention, and on the voluntary return of refugees, both signed by the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. In addition, a Declaration on International Guarantees was signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan and Pakistan signed an agreement (witnessed by the United States and the Soviet Union) governing interrelationships for settlement of the Afghan situation. Under the Accords, the Soviet Union has pledged to withdraw its invasion force of 110,000 by January 15, 1989, with 50% of this cadre to leave Afghanistan by August 15, 1988.

Although our concern is with the plight of the Afghan refugees, and not with the geopolitics of this nine year-long war,^{1/} it is not possible to divorce refugee-related

^{1/} Maps of Afghanistan and the refugee areas in Pakistan can be found at Appendix 1.

issues from the timing and means by which the conflict is ultimately resolved. Indeed, the Accords themselves give rise to a host of questions which directly affect the safety, health and hopes for a return to normalcy for these millions of innocent victims. Central is whether the absence of superpower confrontation over Afghanistan will diminish the commitment of the Western democracies to complete the tasks which lie ahead. By a "diminished commitment" we mean not only a reduced investment of resources, but also an abdication of leadership, principally by the U.S., in helping to shape and monitor the process by which the refugees return to their country and seek to rebuild their shattered lives and homeland.

The Accords directly address the fate of the refugees: over 3 million in Pakistan, 2 million in Iran and possibly 2 million displaced persons within Afghanistan itself. Among other guarantees, the agreements provide that

All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland . . . [and] shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan, . . . the right to work, [and] to adequate living conditions. . . .2/

2/ The full text of the Bilateral Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees, and the other instruments which make up the Geneva Accords, are incorporated as Appendix 2.

Further, the Accords anticipate that repatriation will take 18 months, yet the Commission was persuaded during its visit that no significant return will take place until the fighting ends. (In any event, the 18-month schedule under the Accords covers only Pakistan. Since Iran is not a signatory, refugees within its borders may need to be considered separately.) Removal of Soviet forces alone, however, even if it occurs on schedule, will not end the struggle of the Afghan resistance against the present government in Kabul.

The Commission is composed of persons from the United States and Western Europe, many of whom are not affiliated with the IRC, but who share a deep commitment to the cause of freedom and to the relief and resettlement of Afghanistan's refugees. (The Commission's Membership is indicated at Appendix 3.)

Seven members of the Commission travelled to Pakistan in late May and early June, principally to survey at first hand the situation of the Afghan refugees living in camps within Pakistan, and to evaluate the challenges associated with the return to their native land. Immediately following, we journeyed to Geneva, Switzerland for discussions with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the recently appointed Coordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Programs Relating to Afghanistan, Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan. Our inquiry included

meetings with officials at all levels of the Pakistani government, officials of the U.S. and other governments operating bilateral refugee aid programs in Pakistan and Afghanistan, United Nations agencies, and non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") providing assistance to the refugees. We also met with many of the refugees themselves, both in the camps and elsewhere in Pakistan, and with certain elements of the Afghan resistance.

We are deeply grateful for the time generously extended by the individuals with whom we met, most of whom are preoccupied with the operational challenges of their humanitarian -- and genuinely life-saving -- activities. Without their help, our mission would not have been possible.

The dramatic and inspiring chronicle of the Afghans' heroic, nine-year resistance to an invasion of Soviet troops will not be repeated here. Nor will we reexamine in detail the Geneva Accords. Suffice it to say that expectations among the refugees are high that circumstances will soon permit a safe return to their homeland, after nine years of exile and a war which has imposed terrible costs on their society: nearly one and one-half million dead, nearly 70% of Afghanistan's villages destroyed, along with countless farms and irrigation systems, and an economy which lies in ruins.

Although some progress has been made towards permitting the repatriation of the Afghan refugees, many

serious issues remain unresolved. Absent the most thorough planning and capable implementation of repatriation programs, this closing act of the Afghan conflict could result in further human tragedy of very large proportions.

For the Western democracies, the Geneva Accords would seem to be a diplomatic victory and an affirmation that their commitment to support the Afghans' desire for freedom was not merely just and proper, but successful as well. Despite the infusion of more than one hundred thousand personnel and the waging of a technologically sophisticated war, the Soviets have failed to subjugate the Afghan people.

After nine years of political and economic support for the Afghans' war of liberation, it may be tempting to embrace the Accords as an end in themselves, thus permitting a lessening of the Western commitment. In a world burdened with twelve million permanent refugees, where no level of generosity seems to halt the refugees' numbers and tragedies from growing larger, "compassion fatigue" sets in, and governments as well as most individuals tire of the constant demands on limited resources needed elsewhere.

This would be a grave mistake. For the Afghan refugees, the consequences of an inadequate commitment by the Western democracies to repatriation and resettlement would be utterly devastating. It would deny the Afghan people the chance to complete their victory and would severely tarnish

the bright image justly earned by the West in its extraordinary defense of an Islamic nation willing to fight and die for its independence from Communist repression.

The required amount of funding to achieve a humane repatriation will be more, and not less or the same amount, than that which has been required to maintain the refugees in Pakistan.^{3/}

The hopes for, and recent signs of, achieving a more harmonious relationship between the nuclear superpowers should not be allowed to obscure the practical and economic significance of one of the most massive migrations of people since World War II. The victory was achieved primarily because of the awesome bravery of the Afghan people. If the West perceives a diplomatic achievement in the containment of Soviet aggression, if it sees its own interests well served by the stunning heroism and persistence of the Afghan people, then it must not allow the task of repatriation and reconstruction to go inadequately supported. This process will

^{3/} A report of European Parliamentarians following their mission to Pakistan in 1984 estimated that the value of all humanitarian assistance amounted to 30 cents per day per refugee. The task of relocating more than 3 million people from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and providing them with the ability to become self-sufficient within a wrecked economy and war-torn land, will surely be significantly greater.

require: a substantial additional commitment of public and private funding from the West, and particularly from the United States, which must set the example; a willingness of major donors to press hard for funds from other nations; and a commitment to a coordinated and effective response to the refugee crisis by the several U.N. agencies and numerous NGOs involved in the Afghan effort.

Further, military withdrawal does not mean an end to Soviet efforts to gain influence in the region. A failure by the West to support the reconstruction effort would leave a vacuum for the Soviets to exploit.

On a more practical level, we found a consensus as to three preconditions to any substantial homeward migration: physical security, food and water, and basic health care. These needs will be discussed in greater detail in the body of this report. Briefly, they include:

- o Physical security. The refugees fled because of the military conflict; they will not return without a reasonable assurance that large-scale military operations have terminated (and will not be reinitiated; a protracted civil war after the departure of Soviet troops would stall repatriation). In addition, steps must be taken to deal with the estimated 3 to 5 million antipersonnel mines placed by Soviet forces in roads and fields.
- o Sustenance. The returning refugees will need adequate food supplies to sustain them while they rebuild Afghanistan's agricultural infrastructure. To again become self-sufficient in food, they will require help in rebuilding farms and irrigation systems.

- o Health care. Health care in the refugee camps, while far from an optimum level, has at least prevented widespread death and disease. This threshold level of health care must be moved from the camps into Afghanistan as the refugees return. Otherwise, a serious health crisis, and loss of life, are likely.

These three requirements for repatriation will have to be delivered to millions of people, inside a war-torn country, and against the backdrop of continuing political instability and possibly some degree of military conflict.

It is the intent of the Commission to illuminate the most important issues confronting the relief and resettlement effort, and, by speaking out on its assessment, to remind the Western democracies that their sustained commitment is essential to seal the victory sought after and died for by one and one-half million Afghans. Our hope is that the Report will stimulate informed discussion of the problems, encourage contributions from the private sector, and result in a renewed commitment to see this process of return successfully. Although we offer tentative recommendations in some areas, our principal objective is to inform. The Commission intends to remain involved, to monitor the return, and to issue additional reports at appropriate intervals during the repatriation process.

II. THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE REFUGEE AREAS AND IN AFGHANISTAN

The Afghan refugees represent the largest refugee population in the world. Since the 1979 Soviet invasion, the number of refugees has steadily grown from a trickle to a torrent. Moreover, Afghanistan's continuing political instability could mean that despite the Geneva Accords, the number of refugees will continue to grow prior to the commencement of full-scale repatriation. Indeed, the Commission was advised that heavy fighting in certain areas had resulted in recent weeks in a sudden influx of perhaps as many as 20,000 new refugees in the South.

The number of refugees officially registered by the Government of Pakistan is 3.2 million. Another two million Afghans are believed to be in Iran. Finally, the bloodshed and chaos visited upon the Afghan countryside during nine years of war caused millions of rural Afghans to flee to the cities of Afghanistan, creating an internal Afghan displaced population numbering between 1.5 and 2 million. This brings the total Afghan refugee and displaced population to approximately seven million people -- about 40% of Afghanistan's entire pre-war population.

In Pakistan, many refugees have been able to construct semi-permanent shelters; others make do with tents or other temporary shelters. Although some of the refugee

areas have taken on the appearance of permanent communities, life is far from normal. First and foremost, the refugees are not a self-sufficient population: they rely on the Pakistani government, multilateral and bilateral aid programs, the U.N., and over 75 NGOs for food and other necessities of life. The social fabric of the refugee communities is placed under severe stress, because of the overcrowding, the dependence on outsiders, the boredom of camp life, and the stress of an uncertain future. Children under the age of 13 -- an especially vulnerable group -- make up 44% of the refugee population.

The women face a particularly difficult existence. Islamic law and the Afghan culture discourage contact between Afghan women and outsiders; in the overpopulated refugee camps, this has meant that many women are virtual prisoners in their huts or tents. Refugee workers indicate that the inability to socialize, combined with the other burdens of refugee life, have created a significant problem of psychological depression for these women.

The rigors of camp life mean that most of the refugees will seek to return home rapidly once they can do so in safety. However, it is clear that the refugees do not view the present conditions inside Afghanistan as conducive to a safe homecoming. Aside from the continuing military conflict, the refugees are well aware that conditions inside Afghanistan are bleak. Even before the Soviet invasion,

Afghanistan was one of the poorest countries in the world.

Today, much of what little Afghanistan had has been destroyed.

The war has resulted in:

- o The destruction of 15,000 of the 22,000 villages of pre-war Afghanistan, and another 5,000 made uninhabitable by eight years of saturation bombing, some of which continues to this day.
- o Significant deforestation in a nation already poor in forests.
- o A countryside littered with between 3 and 5 million Soviet antipersonnel mines.
- o The destruction of thousands of Afghanistan's schools.
- o A widespread degradation of the Afghan road system and other essential infrastructure.
- o Widespread damage to irrigation systems and farm acreage, as a result of a Soviet "scorched earth" policy in areas controlled by the resistance. The war damage is compounded by the effects of abandonment: in many areas, the earth has become too hard to be plowed without steel implements -- implements which the Afghans do not possess. Millions of farm animals were deliberately slaughtered during the conflict.

The Afghan people are legendary for their independence, their toughness and their commitment to self-sufficiency. These qualities, and more, will be essential as they confront the challenges of repatriation and reconstruction. However, the people have suffered along with the land. Afghanistan has an enormously high percentage of amputees relative to population; as recently as last month, over 300 new cases were treated in Kabul as a result of current

fighting. A recent report by a U.N. agency estimated that there are between 300-500 thousand Afghans disabled because of the war, the majority of them women and children. Moreover, improvements in the "effectiveness" of weapons has made the destruction of legs and hips more common than in earlier years, when foot amputations were more prevalent. Many of Afghanistan's professional elite -- doctors, engineers and the like -- have emigrated, and most will be reluctant to return.^{4/} Finally, the experience of losing their homeland, even if it is now to be regained, has left lasting scars on the Afghan population.

On the positive side, the level of health care and education available to the refugees in the camps in Pakistan is in several respects superior to that which was available in Afghanistan before the war. However, even that hopeful circumstance is the source of new problems. The refugees' raised expectations will make their readjustment to life in war-torn Afghanistan much more difficult. The international

^{4/} A "Return of Talent" program has been considered, and Commission member Thomas Gouttiere's Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska has investigated the willingness to return (even on a temporary basis) of selected emigres. Although the numbers are not large, the potential benefit of returning even a few highly-trained Afghans makes this an important objective.

community, which sponsored refugee assistance efforts in the camps, has an obligation to ensure that significant gains in nutrition, health care and literacy are not lost when the refugees return home.

III. THE EFFECTIVE DELIVERY OF INTERNATIONAL
ASSISTANCE: LOGISTICS, POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION

The refugees' basic needs -- physical security, sustenance and health care -- are well known to the relief agencies already active in Pakistan and in cross-border operations, and to experts on refugee affairs at UNHCR and elsewhere. At this point, the Commission will not attempt to replicate or second-guess their expertise in such matters. The Commission has focused on a much more difficult question: how should the international relief community coordinate its efforts to overcome the physical and political obstacles to the delivery of assistance?

A. Physical and Demographic Considerations.

The physical delivery of assistance to the refugees before, during and after their repatriation, is a logistical challenge of enormous proportions. Although the U.N. agencies and several of the NGOs already on site have substantial experience in repatriating and resettling refugees, the great size of the Afghan refugee population renders ordinary channels of assistance wholly inadequate. Nothing less than a worldwide commitment of financial, logistical and political support for the repatriation will suffice.

Aside from the great number of persons involved, Afghanistan presents other unique problems. The country is extremely mountainous, making transportation and communication difficult. The destruction of Afghan roads during the war exacerbates that problem. There is justifiable concern that those refugees returning to isolated areas will be deprived of the assistance which is essential to resettlement.

The heterogeneity of Afghan society presents another set of problems. The refugees come from many different tribal groups, and while the primary languages are Pushtu and Dari, there are a number of additional languages spoken by the Afghans. To be successful, the aid effort must be sensitive to the differing needs of each major refugee group.

Serious consideration must also be given to the most appropriate form of the relief aid. Many of the NGOs, as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development ("AID") bilateral effort, have found cash payments to be an effective means of assistance for areas that are physically or politically difficult to service otherwise. Obviously, cash assistance is the most difficult to monitor and supervise, and may be rejected as a solution when other more appropriate means are available. However, there will be some returnees who cannot be aided in any other way.

The Commission also urges adoption of a policy that, in distributing relief, material assistance should not

be allocated in such a way as to further destabilize the already badly fractured economic system within Afghanistan. For example, the distribution of wheat in certain farming areas would serve only to further depress local prices, thereby discouraging farmers from resuming farming activities or encouraging them to produce undesirable crops. In such areas, it might be more beneficial to provide direct monetary assistance in lieu of commodity distributions.

B. Timing.

Organizers of the relief effort will need to accurately predict and to keep current with the pace and intensity of repatriation. Opinions vary widely over the particular circumstances most likely to prevail before the refugees return to Afghanistan in substantial numbers. Key questions include the following:

1. Will Soviet forces have to be entirely withdrawn before significant repatriation begins?
2. Will the removal of 50% of the Soviet forces by August 15, 1988 trigger the repatriation?
3. Must both the Soviets and the puppet government of Najibullah first be gone?
4. Will the termination of fighting in specific areas be sufficient to encourage a gradual return to Afghanistan?

The weight of local opinion solicited by the Commission is that repatriation will not begin until at least two conditions are met: (1) a reasonable degree of physical

security (i.e., an assurance that fighting will not resume once the refugees have returned); and (2) food and water adequate to sustain the population until reconstruction permits self-reliance. In addition, relief officials in particular consider it vital that a health care infrastructure, similar to that now operating in the camps, be in place in Afghanistan. Although many of the refugees may be prepared to return without assurances of basic health care, the consequences of such a decision could well be tragic.

Concern was expressed that there be no "push" or "pull" pressures exerted on the refugees to hasten prematurely their departure from Pakistan; in other words, that no unrealistic expectations be held out. Despite the comforting notion that the Afghans are hardy, self-reliant and highly independent (and they are!), no one questions that they need help. Specialists in agriculture are persuaded that the countryside in Afghanistan could not sustain a rapid influx of people; that the relief agencies are now incapable of supporting a return of even one-third the refugee population; and that the encouragement by outsiders in favor of a premature return (i.e., until resettlement programs are up and running) could trigger a major disaster.

C. Funding And International Coordination.

No one is certain what total amount of assistance will eventually be needed. U.N. Coordinator Sadruddin has requested \$1.166 billion during the next eighteen months. Another \$839 million is sought for the 1990-93 period, bringing the Coordinator's total request to more than \$2 billion. Effective coordination among the many relief agencies will be a serious issue. There are currently 87 such organizations registered in Peshawar, including a number from Arab countries. With the initiation of a major resettlement effort, the number of agencies will expand further. The Commission recognizes that a multinational, coordinated approach through the UNHCR is essential, and applauds the appointment of U.N. Coordinator Sadruddin. His role, that of the UNHCR, and other multilateral organizations now extant, are and will remain central.

However, it is important to note that typically the UNHCR does not have an operational responsibility; that is, it selects others to deliver relief services, but does not itself do so. As the number of relief agencies multiplies, the importance of selecting the most capable ones, and of monitoring and evaluating performance, will become even more important. The potential for waste and careless dispensation of scarce resources will be great. Moreover, the U.N., which officially recognizes the Najibullah regime, may encounter

difficulties from the Afghan resistance, which asserts that there will be no end to the fighting (and thus no return of refugees) until the Najib government is gone. Some NGOs believe that they must take care not to lose credibility with the resistance, by being perceived as indirectly lending legitimacy to the Najib regime.

Many NGOs have developed invaluable experience in specific regions inside Afghanistan, have won the confidence of resistance commanders, and have the greatest competence to determine the needs, capabilities and limitations of the particular regions. In that regard, U.N. Coordinator Sadruddin has announced his reluctance to expand the U.N.'s own administrative apparatus; in his words: "Everything we get should go to Afghanistan." He has endorsed reliance on NGOs already working in the refugee camps, supports cross-border operations, and has given indications of his intentions to function directly with resistance elements in Afghanistan and not through the Kabul government. We support the Coordinator's expressed approach.

D. Political Considerations.

Although the Commission has focused on the repatriation challenge from a humanitarian perspective, and not from a political one, the reality is that sound political judgments will be required to successfully plan and implement the

relief effort. Politics will play a role at every juncture, influencing (among other issues) when the refugees will begin to return home, the type of assistance they will accept, and the physical security of Western relief workers.

Two years ago, encouraged by the U.S. and the government of Pakistan, major political entities in the Afghan resistance formed an "Alliance" of seven parties. Currently, the Alliance is making an effort to form an interim government which would be prepared to assume power when -- as is expected -- Najibullah is toppled. The Alliance is established in Peshawar and is directly involved in channeling aid into Afghanistan. It strongly desires to be the sole recipient of aid from multinational and bilateral sources, as well as the sole determinant of where the aid should be dispensed. However, the granting of aid to a particular group is an act with political ramifications, as it confers substantial power and authority on the group and its leaders. While not meaning to undermine the hope that the Alliance can steer through the difficult transition period ahead, the Commission believes that every effort must be made to remain neutral, until such time as the people of Afghanistan are given the opportunity to select a government of their own choosing in free elections. It is not enough for international aid donors to assert political neutrality; they must also be perceived as neutral by the Afghan people.

In the interim, aid might have to be channelled through several competing centers of political and military power, including the resistance commanders inside Afghanistan and the Alliance. If the resistance military commanders inside Afghanistan gain influence, possibly at the expense of the Alliance leaders in Peshawar, as some observers believe is likely, care must be taken not to alienate the field commanders, especially since their presence inside Afghanistan, and their infrastructure, will be vital to an efficient distribution of aid to the returning refugees. (One such leader, Ahmed Shah Massoud, is reported to have established a governing council and a development plan for reconstruction of his area, the Panjshir Valley.) An undue reliance on the Peshawar-based leaders for aid distribution -- much less any reliance on the Kabul regime -- would compromise the relief effort's credibility with the commanders.

The political atmosphere in Pakistan, the temporary home of most of the refugees, must also be considered in planning the relief effort. The government of Pakistan has responded to the influx of refugees with sensitivity and generosity; over time, however, the expenditure of scarce resources has taken its toll. As far back as 1983, the Pakistani government estimated the annual expenditure on refugee maintenance to be in excess of \$440 million, over \$200 million of which was met from Pakistan's own resources.

Population pressures in refugee areas have led to problems such as an exhaustion of grazing lands, widespread deforestation, land shortages, and diminished water supplies.

The relief effort must continue to cultivate Pakistani goodwill. Pakistan must continue to serve as a point of entry for goods ultimately destined for refugee populations. To date, most refugee relief supplies have been unloaded at Karachi in the south of Pakistan, and transported over land to the refugee settlements in the northwest regions of the country. A similar arrangement will need to be used for the movement of materials to aid in resettlement; this will not be without its own special problems, however, as port facilities are now severely crowded. The government of Pakistan must be asked to play a key role in the physical distribution of aid through its ports and overland, as there seems to be no available alternative.

Changing political conditions may provide new opportunities for the U.S. bilateral aid program. The U.S. effort has been conducted mainly within Pakistan and in some "cross-border" programs, administered by the Agency for International Development ("AID") but carried out by a variety of NGOs (American and foreign). The primary reason why U.S. personnel have not been authorized to participate in relief activities inside Afghanistan appears to have been a concern over engagement with Soviet forces in a combat area.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops and the hoped for termination of hostilities should give rise to a reconsideration of this policy. U.S. AID personnel could be immensely important in the delivery and monitoring effort.

Finally, the Commission takes note of the fact that no one is really certain how long the repatriation process will last. The guarantees in the Geneva Accords concerning refugees remain in effect for only eighteen months (until October 15, 1989), after which time the parties will "review" the situation and ". . . if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for." It is almost certain that the repatriation will not be complete by October 1989, and care will have to be taken that an extension of the guarantees is in place at that time, and that experiences gained between now and then regarding the repatriation effort are taken account of in negotiating the extension.

IV. HEALTH CARE ISSUES

Refugees the world over are victims of poor health and disease and the refugees from Afghanistan are no exception. Owing to the high death rates for infants and young children, there is a special need to improve the health of children and of women in their childbearing years. Moreover, women and children constitute about 70% of the total refugee population in Pakistan.

Health education programs, both preventive and curative, are compromised by the very low literacy rate of the adults (39% of men, 8% of women), most of whom are from rural areas. Another culturally complex constraint is the intense isolation of women, who are largely confined to their living spaces. Yet, despite these obstacles to medical progress, culturally sensitive educational programs for both Afghan women and men inside Pakistan are beginning to improve their health status. The present challenge is to accelerate the development of these programs insofar as possible before the refugees leave Pakistan and to facilitate the transfer of basic health education programs and services to Afghanistan as the refugees are repatriated.

Although there has been substantial improvement in the overall health of refugees during the past several years, much still needs to be done. As will be discussed later in

this Report, too many children still die in infancy and in early childhood. Though reliable data are lacking, maternal mortality rates are probably high due to inadequate immunization of women; neonatal tetanus, usually fatal, is prevalent. While serious malnutrition among refugees is infrequent, chronic undernourishment of children is thought by many health workers to be common. Chronic undernutrition, compounded by recurrent diarrheal illnesses, are well established causes of growth retardation.

During the summer months children and debilitated adults often die from heat stroke. Immunization rates for measles, diphtheria, tetanus, poliomyelitis and whooping cough are far below those recommended by the World Health Organization ("WHO"). Accordingly, these infectious illnesses, along with tuberculosis, malaria and trachoma, remain endemic. The spread of infectious diseases, especially the diarrheal illnesses, and typhoid fever, is enhanced by unsafe water and a lack of fundamental hygienic health practices, such as hand washing. Most deliveries of babies occur in the home and are assisted by traditional birth assistants ("TBAs"), many of whom are still largely unschooled in elementary sterilization techniques. Though stated previously, it needs to be reemphasized that the teaching of modern medical practices is impeded by the low literacy rate and by the isolation of women, especially those who have

emigrated from the rural areas of Afghanistan. Too few community health workers have been trained. The serious shortage of women skilled in primary care and birthing techniques is compounded by the unwillingness of many women to be treated by men and/or the refusal of their husbands to permit it.

On the other hand -- and lest too bleak a picture be painted -- substantial gains have been made. The Afghans themselves have worked hard to improve their living and health standards. Along with commendable support from the Government of Pakistan and the help of voluntary agencies, significant advances in both preventive and curative health practices have been made. Safe food and water supplies and hygienic disposal of human waste have now been established in many camps. More and more community health workers and TBAs are being trained in an acceptable cultural and religious context. Literacy rates, especially among children, are rising rapidly. Concurrently, the importance of good maternal and child health is increasingly appreciated by the refugees. While not yet generally accepted, the subject of modern birth control practices has been opened for discussion in some of the camps. The latter is of special significance because a

recent analysis suggests that the refugee population may now have the highest fertility rate in the world.^{5/}

Good epidemiological data, needed to monitor health programs, is difficult to acquire in refugee situations. Most refugees do not consider acquisition of this information to be of high priority. Moreover, most are unschooled and do not appreciate the science of modern medicine. Serial acquisition of data, i.e., ongoing surveillance of a health problem, requires a level of cooperation that is difficult to implement. Finally, the movement of refugees from one place to another, and the influx of new refugees, complicates the acquisition of this information. Consequently, in the absence of good data, decisions about new programs, redirection of existing programs, and the allocation of resources must necessarily depend on well intentioned opinion. Yet, despite these obstacles, some good information has been acquired. These data, along with an abundance of anecdotal testimony, indicates very substantial improvement in the basic indicators of health in the refugee population. During its short visit the Commission could not acquire or review

^{5/} Specifically, if recent trends were to continue, the average Afghan woman would give birth to 13.6 children by the end of her childbearing years. At this rate, the current population would double within 15 years.

all of the information that has been gathered by UNHCR and the NGOs. Several important studies were, however, called to our attention. Of special note are the studies conducted by the Communicable Disease Center from 1984 through 1986. The 1986 study, by Boss and Lewis, conducted in collaboration with UNHCR, includes the following table:

AFGHAN REFUGEES IN PAKISTAN, 1986
SURVEY RESULTS BY GEOGRAPHIC AREA

<u>Item</u>	<u>All areas</u> ¹	<u>NWFP/Punjab</u> ²	<u>Baluchistan</u> ³
Total Families interviewed	1612	1228	648
Number of children <5 years old	2439	1943	970
Alive at the time of interview	2368	1892	934
Died past 12 months	71	51	36
Number of live births in past year	627	502	230
Children <1 year, died in past year	51	32	25
Infant mortality rate	81/1000	64/1000	109/1000
Neonatal mortality rate	40/1000	40/1000	43/1000
Percent dying before fifth birthday	12.1	11.1	15.5
Percent of children with BCG scar	55	55	51
Percent of children weighted:			
≥ median	42	43	33
< 80% of median	1.9	1.1	4.2
< 70% of median	0.2	0.2	--

1 Represents 30 clusters

2 Represents 24 clusters

3 Represents 12 clusters

Despite certain caveats concerning methodology which are discussed in the report, the evidence to support improvement of health status of refugee children is impressive. Noteworthy are the decreases from 1984 through 1986 in the infant mortality rate (156/1,000 - 81/1,000); the neonatal mortality rate (61/1,000 - 40/1,000); and the percentage of children dying before their fifth birthday. Dangerous malnutrition (less than 70% of median weight) was rare and modest malnutrition (less than 80% of median weight) constituted only 1.9% of children surveyed in 1986. Though better than in 1984, the high percentage of children who had diarrhea within seven days of the study reflects in large measure unsafe water supplies or poor hygiene. Additionally, the study implies that diarrhea is the most common recognized cause of death in young children (see Appendix 4). The study did not evaluate the use of oral rehydration therapy (ORT), which by itself has been shown to significantly reduce death rates in children with severe dehydration caused by diarrhea.

The study calls special attention to the neonatal tetanus rate of 13/1,000 live births and cites the WHO goal of one death per 1,000 live births by 1990 and no deaths by the year 2000. Death from neonatal tetanus in developed countries is practically non-existent. The relatively low level of BCG (tuberculosis) immunization is probably

indicative of similarly low immunization rates for other standard immunizations (diphtheria-pertussis-typhus ("DPT"), measles and polio).

A more recent study on immunizations by Saranan and Kheill in refugee villages in Baluchistan shows that a wholly inadequate number of children and women have received their basic immunizations and recommends vigorous implementation of an expanded immunization program. From these studies and other information acquired by voluntary agencies, it is safe to conclude that the immunization rate of Afghan refugees in Pakistan is still too low.

Active, contagious tuberculosis is common. The UNHCR 1986 Operational Manual for the Afghan Refugee Health Programs cites a 1981 survey which shows "X-ray positive TB in 6.89% of the refugees and 2% of the Pakistanis who were studied." Tuberculin positivity among refugee children, an indication of prior infection, is still substantially higher than among Pakistani children. A survey conducted in 1984 in the Northwest Frontier Province and in Baluchistan showed a positivity rate of 32.1%, which means that almost one-third of the children had been infected.

In 1987 Krigjh studied the health status of Afghan women and children in ten refugee camps in the Northwest Frontier Province. The author's summary finds:

- o a continued decreasing trend of infant mortality from 87/1,000 - to 52/1,000;

- o a decrease of child mortality from 11.8% to 10.4%;
- o a decline of diarrhea prevalence from 39% to 27.7%;
- o a decline of moderately malnourished children from 8% to 1.2% and of severely malnourished children from 4.2% to 0.3%;
- o a rise of BCG scar evidence from 68.7% to 79.3%;
- o a decline in prevalence of measles from 15.2% to 8.6%;
- o an increase in the use of drinking water from an improved source from 32% to 64.9%;
- o a rise in the use of ventilated pit latrines from 43% to 46.4%; and
- o an increase in the presence of poultry and live stocks in the compounds from 52% to 100%.

The author also says that "the improvement of overall health and decline in infant mortality, combined with a unique socio-cultural environment, have produced a fertility rate that may well be the highest in recorded history -- by the end of her childbearing years, the average Afghan woman would have given birth to 13.6 children. Furthermore, when it does achieve this rate, more than 50% of the population will be less than 15 years of age."

In sum, these data indicate that the health of Afghan refugees inside Pakistan is indeed improving. This improvement is in large measure a consequence of better nutrition, improved sanitation, safe water supplies, better control of certain infectious diseases, and the development

of training programs for the Afghan community, especially female health workers, and traditional birth assistants.

Now, however, is no time for complacency. Immunization rates of 30-40% are still far below targeted goals of 80-90%. Maternal and child mortality rates are still unacceptably high. Malaria, tuberculosis, and other diseases, such as trachoma, a leading cause of blindness, are still endemic. (See Appendix 4.) Epidemics of meningitis and cholera are a constant threat. Severe malnutrition is not now a major problem, but could become rapidly troublesome if food is inadequate for refugees after their return to Afghanistan.

Moreover, inside Afghanistan the capability to provide modern basic health services has either never been developed in rural areas or has been destroyed by the war. The refugees say that most clinics and hospitals have been badly damaged, and that outside the cities trained health workers are virtually non-existent. An integrated system of primary, secondary and tertiary care does not exist. Considerable epidemiological data has been gathered by NGOs working inside the country, but has not been analyzed by the Commission. Recent data (1986) tabulated by UNICEF show that Afghanistan has the highest infant mortality rates in the world. In 1986, the mortality rate of infants less than one year of age was 185 per 1,000 live births, compared with 111 per 1,000 live births in Pakistan. And, not surprisingly,

life expectancy at birth in Afghanistan is only 39 years, second only to Sierra Leone (36 years) in its severity; in neighboring Iran, the corresponding figure is 59 years.

This, then, is a thumbnail sketch of the sorry situation to which the refugees will return. Thus, it is frightening to contemplate what might happen if aid to the refugees cannot be increased. Without adequate food, safe water, and the continued development of basic health services, the health status of the returning refugees could rapidly deteriorate. It is no exaggeration to say that there exists the potential for a real medical disaster.

It is beyond the scope of this Report to formulate detailed medical recommendations for the resettlement of refugees. However, it is very clear to members of the Commission that the following should be incorporated into the strategies designed to maintain the health of the Afghan people:

A. For The Refugees In Pakistan

- o To minimize problems after resettlement, the current efforts to improve the health of refugees should be accelerated. The emphasis on preventive health measures should be continued.
- o As already recommended by UNHCR and the NGOs, immunization of women and children in the child-bearing age should be accelerated. A target immunization rate of 80-90% is desirable.
- o Supplementary feeding programs for the undernourished, especially very young children and pregnant and lactating women, should be maximized.

- o Culturally sensitive training programs for community workers, especially female health workers and traditional birth attendants, should be expanded. This training should assume that these workers may have to function more independently after resettlement.
- o Sanitary practices designed to curtail the spread of diarrheal and other water-bred infectious diseases should be emphasized.
- o The existing concern about the prevalence of tuberculosis warrants special consideration. Whenever possible treatment should be completed prior to departure. Refugee health workers have expressed valid concern about the continuation of anti-tuberculosis treatment for those whose treatment will not be completed prior to departure. They recognize the need for a specific logistical plan to continue this treatment.
- o Improve ongoing monitoring and health care surveillance of refugee health.
- o A "cold chain" (a system for keeping vaccines at the proper temperature until they are administered) should be established as quickly as possible so that the immunization programs can be continued.

B. Refugees En Route

It is generally assumed that most refugees will travel only a few days in order to return to their homes. While en route, essential drugs and emergency first aid will have to be provided. While the Commission recognizes the need for these services in-transit, no logistical plan for accommodating these needs was brought to the Commission's attention. The Commission urges that high priority be assigned for the development of such a plan and that this planning be categorically funded.

C. After Resettlement

Truly effective long-term planning for health care inside Afghanistan must necessarily await political stability, including the establishment of a functional ministry of health. The time that will be required to achieve this stability is uncertain. Moreover, the existing data base for health planning is inadequate and cannot be acquired in the immediate future and certainly not until the relocation of refugees and displaced persons inside Afghanistan has been completed. Even then, the logistical, educational, and cultural barriers likely to impede the acquisition of this information will be formidable. Meanwhile, the needs of a valiant people cannot be ignored. Therefore the Commission recommends that:

- o Whenever logistically feasible, existing health programs should be transferred to areas inside Afghanistan that become secure. Political stability may at first be only local or regional. The safety of health workers themselves, and the expatriates who assist them, must be assured.
- o Inside Afghanistan the focus should continue to be provision of health care services, preventive and curative, to women and children.
- o High priority should be given to basic nutrition and sanitation.
- o The training of community health workers and TBAs must be specifically targeted. This training should be under the aegis of Afghan physicians and nurses. Expatriate health workers should serve only as teachers and advisors to the Afghan staff.

- o Decisions regarding implementation of these programs should be based on very pragmatic considerations, e.g., which individuals and which agencies have the resources and the experience to do the job, and who actually controls the geographic regions? Funding allocations, especially by agencies such as U.S. AID, will initially have to be based largely on opinion and practical considerations. They cannot await optimal epidemiological data that does not now exist and that cannot be acquired in the immediate future. It is hoped that these agencies will generously fund surveillance projects that will acquire information for future decisions about allocation of resources.

Finally, a word is in order about the organization of the existing health care programs and those to be continued during the repatriation phase. The Commission heard repeatedly, usually from high echelon managers and officials, that there needs to be better coordination -- especially better coordination among the NGOs. Several new coordinating mechanisms, both in Pakistan and in Geneva, are being considered. However, given the realities of the existing organizational matrix, the absence of line authority by any agency or official, the traditional *modus operandi* of private voluntary agencies, and the *realpolitik* of governments and their agencies, the Commission became convinced that another layer of bureaucracy charged with a duty "to coordinate" health care is not likely to be effective. In fact, it might just compound the problem. We also became aware that at the "working level" the need to improve coordination is recognized. We therefore suggest that:

- o A pressing effort be made to support the health care coordinating function of UNHCR and the already established coordinating councils of NGOs working inside Pakistan and across the border.
- o Donor agencies and governments strengthen coordination by allocating funds primarily to those organizations that not only have the resources to do the job, but which have a good record of cooperation and coordination.

V. THE NEED FOR SUSTENANCE OF THE
REFUGEE POPULATION

Two of the most urgent needs of the returning refugees will be initial food supplies to carry them through the first growing season, and farm implements and materials with which to rebuild their farms and reestablish agricultural self-sufficiency. Prolonged periods of saturation bombing by the Soviets have exacted a heavy toll on Afghanistan's farming regions. Deserted farmlands have lost essential nutrients and in many instances have been physically damaged by the fighting. Many farm animals were abandoned by their owners, and those that were brought into refuge have been plagued with diseases due to a lack of veterinary care; large draft animals (including horses, camels and mules) were usually slaughtered when found by Soviet troops. Vital irrigation systems, on which Afghanistan relies for approximately 85% of its agricultural production, were seriously damaged during the war and must be rebuilt.

The most immediate concern for the period of repatriation will be the assurance of adequate food supplies until Afghanistan's farmlands begin to yield crops once again. In addition, some form of temporary income maintenance will be needed in order to compensate farmers for revenues lost during the transition period. A reliable and adequate means of transportation will be needed to ensure a

steady and smooth flow of supplies to needy regions. Any food assistance program must be carefully planned and managed, so as to avoid creating local surpluses of commodities (most notably wheat) which would discourage production by local farmers. The allocation of temporary food supplies must also take into account the possibility that not all refugees will return to their pre-war towns or villages, perhaps choosing instead to begin a new life in a different, and more desirable, location. A large-scale shifting of population will alter historical patterns of demand upon local food sources; both the short-term and longer term food and agricultural assistance efforts should be designed with sufficient flexibility to accommodate unanticipated population movements.

Agricultural production has declined steadily in Afghanistan, to a level estimated by some to be one-half the pre-war level. Declines are attributable primarily to labor shortages, the destruction of vital irrigation systems, and widespread loss of livestock due to starvation or destruction. Production has fallen off particularly harshly in rural regions of Afghanistan, due primarily to the wartime deterioration of the rural infrastructure including roads, bridges, culverts, and drainage systems.

To cite one experience, the Agricultural Assistance Project ("AAP"), which the International Rescue Committee ("IRC") has been conducting in the refugee areas, could be

used as a model in structuring agricultural assistance during resettlement. Under this program, seeds, seedlings and technical advice were provided to over 14,000 refugee families during 1987. The program generated an impressive payoff ratio, as the total value of vegetables produced exceeded the costs of implementation by a margin of twenty-five to one. A program of this nature, tailored to the particular needs of a farm population returning to fallow land, will be an essential component of the overall assistance effort.

Another AAP program has been the Poultry Farming Project, under which 6 to 8-week-old layers were sold to almost 5,000 refugee families in 1987. The hens have provided a source of needed protein, both through egg production and as meat after their productive period is over. During repatriation, a similar but more comprehensive effort will be required, one which includes a means of repopulating Afghanistan with cattle and large draft animals, and which provides essential support in the areas of veterinary care and animal husbandry.

A comprehensive relief program must include horticultural assistance to reforest Afghanistan. The deforestation that occurred during the war has upset the biological balance within the country. Returning refugees will need to replace lost trees for purposes of shade, fuel, fruit, and timber, and to combat soil erosion. The horticultural wing

of the AAP distributed 67,500 shade trees to the refugee camps during 1987, and plans to distribute 40,775 fruit trees this year. A similar, more substantial effort will be required in Afghanistan itself as the refugees return.

In terms of technical and material assistance, the most pressing needs of the returning refugees will include the replacement of lost farm implements and the rebuilding of damaged or destroyed irrigation systems. It is estimated up to one-half of Afghanistan's irrigation systems were either destroyed by the Soviets or damaged by neglected maintenance during the war. The country's wheat crop, a crop that must lead the agricultural renaissance in post-war Afghanistan, is particularly dependent on irrigation. Any relief program must assign a high priority to these matters, for all other types of agricultural assistance (seeds, seedlings, animals, etc.) will be given in vain unless an adequate system is in place to insure delivery of needed water. The farm economy of pre-war Afghanistan was overwhelmingly dependent on irrigation, and this need will be at least as great as the farmlands are returned to productive use.

U.N. Coordinator Sadruddin has released a report in which it is estimated that the total amount of money that will be required for food supplies, agricultural assistance, and rural development over the next five years is approximately \$1 billion. Of this amount, \$335.4 million would be

used to provide short-term food supplies, and another \$332.4 million would provide start-up agricultural and irrigation assistance to prepare for the first growing season. Longer term assistance in the amount of \$383.7 million would be used to complete the restoration of farmlands and irrigation systems, and to rebuild the rural infrastructure, including roads and drainage systems.

Afghanistan is a nation of farmers. Before the war, agriculture accounted for approximately 60% of the country's gross national product. For most of the refugees, repatriation will mean a return to farming -- initially for sustenance, and ultimately as a principle means of livelihood. In the Commission's view, the importance of the agricultural portion of the overall relief effort cannot be overemphasized.

VI. SPECIAL ISSUES AFFECTING WOMEN

Over 75% of the refugees are women and children, the special needs of whom must be given special consideration as relief programs are developed. The Commission, while cognizant of different cultural perspectives, recommends that major donors (in their funding of the U.N. appeal for Afghanistan, and in their own bilateral aid programs) specifically make available funding for programs which will enhance the opportunities for women to contribute to the reconstruction of post-war Afghanistan.

It is estimated that over 90% of Afghan women are illiterate. The birth rate in the refugee camps in Pakistan is the highest recorded in the world. At present it is 400 per one thousand.

Clearly, if Afghanistan is to be reconstructed as a nation, and if these brave families who have suffered so much in reclaiming their homeland are to be able to bring needed skills and training to the task, women must play a significant role. Their educational needs, their health needs, and their skills training needs must be an integral part of any program of reconstruction.

During their visit to the border regions of Pakistan, members of the Commission discussed this question at length with a wide variety of people. It was discussed with Afghan

refugee women working as school administrators, teachers, and medical professionals (both doctors and nurses). Conversations were also held with young Afghan female students who attend the only high school for Afghan women available in Pakistan today.

In all cases, these women said that programs that would allow them to reach more fully their human potential were an essential part of what is needed in Afghanistan. One of the Commission's members queried a class of high school girls about their aspirations. The responses were that they wanted to be judges, doctors, engineers and pilots! Afghanistan badly needs those skills. Recognizing the need to be sensitive to the local culture, where Afghan society is prepared to accept this degree of modernization, funding should be made available. In addition, members of this Commission met with Afghan male medical doctors, who have founded clinics serving the medical needs of women in Peshawar. They fully intend to return to a pacified Afghanistan, and bring their medical skills with them.

In the culture of Afghanistan, most women's medical needs are administered by female health professionals. To provide an adequate level of health care to this needy population, opportunities for education and literacy training must be made available throughout the country, as well as programs which upgrade the skills of female community health professionals.

At this moment in Pakistan one program to train Lady Health Visitors is oversubscribed by two times the number of places available for training. Women and their families are saying: "Give us the training we need."

One of the Commission members spoke with a young Afghan father, who has fought for three and a half years in the Jihad. He now plans to leave for Australia, with his young wife and daughter, because, as he said, it was there that his wife could get an education.

Today in Peshawar, a brave Afghan woman once a school principal in Kabul, and herself the mother of seven children, has founded a high school for girls. She staffs it with young teachers who themselves have fled Afghanistan, and wait with their own young children to return to a country that offers everyone a chance for freedom.

In responding to the U.N. appeal, the Commission urges all nations in which women are able to experience a full range of human rights to insure that funding is earmarked so that in a newly reconstructed Afghanistan the rights of women to develop their human potential will be accorded greater recognition and opportunity for growth. This should be accomplished by encouraging Afghan women to be trained in those skills that will be particularly needed in post-war Afghanistan.

VII. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES

The American members of the Commission^{6/} believe that the United States has a moral obligation to assist the coming repatriation in every way possible. The Afghans have sacrificed their lives to repel the Soviet invaders. As President Reagan noted last year in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly:

"The world community must continue to insist on genuine self-determination, prompt and full Soviet withdrawal, and the genuine return of the refugees to their homes in safety and honor."

The United States has performed admirably in support of the resistance, and has contributed the largest share among the free world donors towards refugee relief in the form of substantial monetary and human resource contributions, to both multilateral efforts and America's own, bilateral assistance program. (See Appendix 6 for an indication of pledges of donations for repatriation received thus far.)

The United States, in particular, must remain committed to the Afghan resettlement and reconstruction process.

^{6/} Understandably, the non-U.S. members of the Commission were reluctant to participate in this section of the Report, although it is clearly a belief common to all that strong U.S. leadership and involvement is essential.

A more substantial U.S. commitment is justified, for at least four reasons: the Afghans have fought and died to advance the cause of freedom; the United States has encouraged that fight for independence since its inception; the United States is a guarantor of the Geneva Accords, which include a promise that the refugees can return to their homeland in safety and dignity; and finally, the international community looks to the United States to set the example in Afghanistan.

At a camp in Hangu, administered by the International Rescue Committee, with a refugee population exceeding 190,000, an Afghan University-trained engineer who supervises construction projects aimed at teaching his fellow refugees self-reliance in repairing roads and building houses and schools, spoke with eloquence of the aspirations of his people:

We express our thanks and gratitude for your sympathy with the Afghan people who are struggling for freedom. We hope that the United States and others who respect the human rights and dignity of a free-born people would continue to assist us in any way feasible, because our needs are great.

In light of the special American obligations to the Afghan people, the U.S. must not take a back seat on refugee assistance to the international community, waiting for others to fill the large gap which exists. The Commission has already stated its belief that a broad, multilateral commitment to assist the Afghan refugees is necessary. Given the

magnitude of the task, no other approach is conceivable. However, the Commission believes the U.S. must be a leader in that effort. To do otherwise would be to lend credence to the arguments of those who portray U.S. assistance to the resistance as a purely self-interested intervention, undertaken for purely strategic purposes related to U.S.-Soviet relations, and unconcerned with the human tragedy of the Soviet occupation.

Some of America's friends and allies in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East have been generous contributors of humanitarian assistance to the Afghan resistance in recent years. Many of these same countries have also contributed to the assistance and ultimate repatriation of the refugees currently in Pakistan. They will certainly expect, and rightfully so, that the United States will play a critical leadership role in the post-occupation efforts at resettlement and rebuilding. Numerous nations have already pledged amounts toward the U.N. Coordinator's \$1.1 billion request. (See Appendix 6.) These pledges, while commendable, must be increased, and the private sector must increase its contribution also.

In the wake of the April 14th agreement on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the European Parliament passed a resolution expressing support for the Afghan people and calling upon member countries "to make a

substantial contribution to the reconstruction of Afghanistan." This attractive rhetoric awaits an appropriate commitment of funds.

It should be remembered that during nine years of war Afghanistan has not received aid from the World Bank or other sources of international development funding. U.N. Coordinator Sadruddin assesses this foregone aid as exceeding \$3 billion. Thus, the \$1.1 billion that the U.N. has requested for repatriation is less than half of what Afghanistan would have received in development aid had it been at peace.

The Commission urges the United States Congress to sustain its leadership role in respect of Afghanistan by continuing to closely monitor Administration policies and ensuring the appropriation of adequate funds to the relief effort. As far back as 1982, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee passed its first resolution urging the Administration to provide material assistance to the people of Afghanistan to help them fight to regain their freedom. The Congress has fought the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan with a thoughtful, vigorous and bipartisan approach which, in the Commission's view, exemplifies the best in American foreign policy. Its involvement includes the following measures:

- The passage in October 1984 of the Tsongas-Ritter resolution, which offered the Afghan resistance fighters their first formal expression of American support;

- The establishment in 1985 of the Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan, which, under Senator Humphrey's leadership, coalesced support for the resistance and led directly to U.S. military and humanitarian assistance;
- The provision of funds in 1985 for the establishment of Radio Free Afghanistan;
- A significant increase in the amount of money appropriated for humanitarian assistance to the Afghan refugees. U.S. aid now totals \$119 million (fiscal 1988), including \$45 million for cross-border humanitarian assistance, \$12 million for cross-border food aid under P.L. 480, \$10 million for the McCollum Program, and \$52 million for refugee programs in Pakistan (including multilateral efforts).
- Finally, in February of this year, a unanimous resolution in which the U.S. Senate expressed "its support for increased United States humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people during and following the withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet bloc forces."

The Commission recognizes that in many respects the Congress has led the Administration in the implementation of support programs for Afghanistan and it hopes that the Congress will continue to respond to the challenges which remain as the Afghan people return to their country in "dignity and honor."

It is said that adequate monies may not be available, that other refugee programs may have to be sacrificed to assist Afghans, or that this is primarily a multilateral effort, in which direct U.S. participation should be limited. The Commission believes that an abdication of this sort on the part of the United States would be unwise. The people of

Afghanistan have been economically and emotionally devastated by the atrocities that have been visited upon them during the past nine years. They are surely deserving of immediate attention and assistance by the United States and others -- in amounts greater than those that have been proposed thus far, and with a sense that the U.S. will not remove itself from shaping and influencing the process of repatriation and reconstruction.

The Congress and the Administration can take justifiable satisfaction in pursuing a successful foreign policy. How often have we paid dearly for a foreign policy gone astray? How frequently have we been unable to achieve our objectives despite best efforts? In Afghanistan, we became involved because we recognized that our national interests would be served by freedom prevailing over tyranny. The investment has paid off handsomely. However, the achievement is principally that of the Afghan people, who fought so valiantly for their freedom. Surely, we should lead our allies in rewarding this courage of the Afghan people, and in promoting the type of heroic self-help that they displayed. No nation but the United States can set the standard for others to follow.

VIII. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

As more fully discussed in the body of the Report, our tentative recommendations for the coming repatriation include the following:

General (See Chapter I.)

1. Repatriation will require a three-fold response from the Western nations:

- o From Western sources, and especially the United States, a substantial commitment of public and private funds -- above what is presently being provided.
- o A campaign to obtain financial support from non-Western nations also.
- o A plan for coordination among the many U.N. agencies, bilateral aid programs, and non-governmental organizations that are or will be assisting the Afghan refugees.

2. The refugees have three basic preconditions for repatriation:

- o Physical security, including the removal of anti-personnel mines.
- o Adequate food and water, and the means to make post-war Afghanistan agriculturally self-sufficient.
- o A minimum level of health care.

Delivery of International Assistance (See Chapter III.)

3. The refugees should not be pressured, for political or other reasons, to return home to Afghanistan before an adequate relief apparatus is in place.

4. The clearing of anti-personnel mines, and the repair of roads, irrigation systems and other infrastructure essential to restoring agricultural self-sufficiency, must begin as soon as possible, since these are preconditions to any other reconstruction activity.

5. The United Nations and its constituent agencies, such as UNHCR, should be encouraged to use the U.N.'s unique fundraising and consciousness raising capabilities to raise funds multilaterally. However, the U.N. Coordinator's decision to channel those funds to governmental and non-governmental programs already working in Pakistan and in cross border operations, and to avoid creating an extensive administrative apparatus at the U.N. level, is correct.

6. The relief effort, while preserving its political neutrality, must be sensitive to the political developments that will influence its ability to aid the refugees. In particular, it should avoid undue association with the Kabul regime. It should maintain constructive relationships with the resistance field commanders inside Afghanistan, who will control access to much of the country and whose influence may grow in coming months.

7. Aid distribution should rely heavily on those non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") that have experience delivering aid inside Afghanistan.

8. Now that Soviet forces have evacuated many areas of Afghanistan, the U.S. should reconsider its policy against allowing U.S. personnel to enter Afghanistan.

9. Aid distribution should avoid creating destabilizing effects on Afghan markets. For example, distributions of food aid should not be allowed to depress local agricultural prices. Otherwise, the restoration of Afghan self-sufficiency in food will be delayed.

10. Pakistan must be asked to facilitate the free and rapid transport of refugee assistance across its border with Afghanistan.

11. Cash assistance should be considered for inaccessible areas of Afghanistan, or in places where commodity distributions would distort local markets.

Health Care (See Chapter IV.)

12. To minimize problems after resettlement, current efforts inside the camps to improve the refugees' health should be accelerated. This effort should include:

- o Immunizations.
- o Supplementary feeding for young children, pregnant women, and lactating mothers.

- o Training of Afghans to act as health care workers after repatriation.
- o Teaching sanitary practices.
- o Anti-tuberculosis treatments.
- o Improved monitoring of the refugees' health status.

13. A plan for providing refugees in transit with essential drugs and emergency first aid must be developed.

14. The health care infrastructure now available to the refugees must be duplicated in Afghanistan. This will entail:

- o Measures to ensure the physical safety of Western health care personnel inside Afghanistan.
- o The targeting of programs for women and children, basic nutrition and sanitary practices.
- o Creating a "cold chain" system to preserve vaccines at the required temperatures.
- o Training health workers who will work inside Afghanistan.

The provision of health care, like other needs, requires extensive international coordination. Organizations with a good record of cooperation should be preferred in the distribution of multilateral funds.

Sustenance (See Chapter V.)

15. A plan must be developed for providing the refugees with food and water until such time as they have restored Afghanistan's own agricultural system and water supplies.

16. The rebuilding of damaged or destroyed irrigation systems (on which Afghanistan relies for 85% of its agricultural production) must be the cornerstone of the agricultural relief effort; until an adequate system is in place to ensure delivery of needed water, all other agricultural assistance will be given in vain.

17. To restore Afghanistan's agricultural economy, plans must be developed to provide the repatriates with:

- o Seeds and seedlings.
- o Draft animals (including assistance with veterinary care and animal husbandry)
- o Basis farm implements.
- o Horticultural assistance to replace lost trees.

Special Issues Affecting Women (See Chapter VI.)

18. Priority should be assigned to improving the education of Afghan women, who represent a significant national resource for the rebuilding of post-war Afghanistan.


19. The training of female health care workers is vital because Afghan culture discourages the treatment of female patients by male health care workers.


The Role of the United States (See Chapter VII.)

20. Because the world looks to the United States for leadership on Afghanistan, and because U.S. assistance


was instrumental in bringing about the Soviet withdrawal that will enable the refugees to return, the U.S. must lead the international effort to repatriate the Afghan refugees.

21. A substantial commitment of American funds to the U.N.'s multilateral fundraising effort -- more than has been promised thus far -- must be part of that leadership role.





Source: U.S. Department of State



6650 12 6- STATE MAPS GE1

Source: U.S. Department of State

SG/1860
14 April 1988

TEXTS OF:

BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
ON PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS, IN PARTICULAR ON
NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-INTERVENTION

DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
ON VOLUNTARY RETURN OF REFUGEES

AGREEMENT ON INTERRELATIONSHIPS FOR SETTLEMENT
OF SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

14 April 1988

Bilateral Agreement
between the Republic of Afghanistan
and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in
Particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Considering that full observance of the principle of non-interference and non-intervention in the international and external affairs of States is of the greatest importance for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the fulfilment of the purpose and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming the inalienable right of States freely to determine their own political, economic, cultural and social systems in accordance with the will of their peoples without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever,

Mindful of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations as well as the resolutions adopted by the United Nations on the principle of non-interference and non-intervention, in particular the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, of 24 October 1970, as well as the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, of 9 December 1981,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Relations between the High Contracting Parties shall be conducted in strict compliance with the principle of non-interference and non-intervention by States in the affairs of other States.

Article II

For the purpose of implementing the principles of non-interference and non-intervention each High Contracting Party undertakes to comply with the following obligations:

- (1) to respect the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity, national unity, security and non-alignment of the other High Contracting Party, as well as the national identity and cultural heritage of its people;

(more)

Press Release SG/1860
14 April 1988

- (2) to respect the sovereign and inalienable right of the other High Contracting Party freely to determine its own political, economic, cultural and social systems, to develop its international relations and to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, in accordance with the will of its people, and without outside intervention, interference, subversion, coercion or threat in any form whatsoever;
- (3) to refrain from the threat or use of force in any form whatsoever so as not to violate the boundaries of each other, to disrupt the political, social or economic order of the other High Contracting Party, to overthrow or change the political system of the other High Contracting Party or its Government, or to cause tension between the High Contracting Parties;
- (4) to ensure that its territory is not used in any manner which would violate the sovereignty, political independence, territorial integrity and national unity or disrupt the political, economic and social stability of the other High Contracting Party;
- (5) to refrain from armed intervention, subversion, military occupation or any other form of intervention and interference, overt or covert, directed at the other High Contracting Party, or any act of military, political or economic interference in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party, including acts of reprisal involving the use of force;
- (6) to refrain from any action or attempt in whatever form or under whatever pretext to destabilize or to undermine the stability of the other High Contracting Party or any of its institutions;
- (7) to refrain from the promotion, encouragement or support, direct or indirect, of rebellious or secessionist activities against the other High Contracting Party, under any pretext whatsoever, or from any other action which seeks to disrupt the unity or to undermine or subvert the political order of the other High Contracting Party;
- (8) to prevent within its territory the training, equipping, financing and recruitment of mercenaries from whatever origin for the purpose of hostile activities against the other High Contracting Party, or the sending of such mercenaries into the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly to deny facilities, including financing for the training, equipping and transit of such mercenaries;
- (9) to refrain from making any agreements or arrangements with other States designed to intervene or interfere in the internal and external affairs of the other High Contracting Party;
- (10) to abstain from any defamatory campaign, vilification or hostile propaganda for the purpose of intervening or interfering in the internal affairs of the other High Contracting Party;

(more)

- (11) to prevent any assistance to or use of or tolerance of terrorist groups, saboteurs or subversive agents against the other High Contracting Party;
- (12) to prevent within its Territory the presence, harbouring, in camps and bases or otherwise, organizing, training, financing, equipping and arming of individuals and political, ethnic and any other groups for the purpose of creating subversion, disorder or unrest in the territory of the other High Contracting Party and accordingly also to prevent the use of mass media and the transportation of arms, ammunition and equipment by such individuals and groups;
- (13) not to resort to or to allow any other action that could be considered as interference or intervention.

Article III

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Article IV

Any steps that may be required in order to enable the High Contracting Parties to comply with the provisions of Article II of this Agreement shall be completed by the date on which this Agreement enters into force.

Article V

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan)

(more)

Declaration on International Guarantees

The Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States of America,

Expressing support that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have concluded a negotiated political settlement designed to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness between the two countries as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region;

Wishing in turn to contribute to the achievement of the objectives that the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan have set themselves, and with a view to ensuring respect for their sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment;

Undertake to invariably refrain from any form of interference and intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and to respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-Interference and Non-Intervention;

Urge all States to act likewise.

The present Declaration shall enter into force on 15 May 1988.

Done at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988 in five original copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

(Signed by the USSR and the USA)

(more)

Press Release SG/1860
14 April 1988

Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan
and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees

The Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the High Contracting Parties,

Desiring to normalize relations and promote good-neighbourliness and co-operation as well as to strengthen international peace and security in the region,

Convinced that voluntary and unimpeded repatriation constitutes the most appropriate solution for the problem of Afghan refugees present in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan and having ascertained that the arrangements for the return of the Afghan refugees are satisfactory to them,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

All Afghan refugees temporarily present in the territory of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall be given the opportunity to return voluntarily to their homeland in accordance with the arrangements and conditions set out in the present Agreement.

Article II

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan shall take all necessary measures to ensure the following conditions for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees to their homeland:

- (a) All refugees shall be allowed to return in freedom to their homeland;
- (b) All returnees shall enjoy the free choice of domicile and freedom of movement within the Republic of Afghanistan;
- (c) All returnees shall enjoy the right to work, to adequate living conditions and to share in the welfare of the State;
- (d) All returnees shall enjoy the right to participate on an equal basis in the civic affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan. They shall be ensured equal benefits from the solution of the land question on the basis of the Land and Water Reform;
- (e) All returnees shall enjoy the same rights and privileges, including freedom of religion, and have the same obligations and responsibilities as any other citizens of the Republic of Afghanistan without discrimination.

The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan undertakes to implement these measures and to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

(more)

Press Release SG/1860
14 April 1988

Article III

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall facilitate the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of all Afghan refugees staying within its territory and undertakes to provide, within its possibilities, all necessary assistance in the process of repatriation.

Article IV

For the purpose of organizing, co-ordinating and supervising the operations which should effect the voluntary, orderly and peaceful repatriation of Afghan refugees, there shall be set up mixed commissions in accordance with the established international practice. For the performance of their functions the members of the commissions and their staff shall be accorded the necessary facilities, and have access to the relevant areas within the territories of the High Contracting Parties.

Article V

With a view to the orderly movement of the returnees, the commissions shall determine frontier crossing points and establish necessary transit centres. They shall also establish all other modalities for the phased return of refugees, including registration and communication to the country of return of the names of refugees who express the wish to return.

Article VI

At the request of the Governments concerned, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees will co-operate and provide assistance in the process of voluntary repatriation of refugees in accordance with the present Agreement. Special agreements may be concluded for this purpose between UNHCR and the High Contracting Parties.

Article VII

The present Agreement shall enter into force on 15 May 1988. At that time the mixed commissions provided in Article IV shall be established and the operations for the voluntary return of refugees under this Agreement shall commence.

The arrangements set out in Articles IV and V above shall remain in effect for a period of eighteen months. After that period the High Contracting Parties shall review the results of the repatriation and, if necessary, consider any further arrangements that may be called for.

Article VIII

This Agreement is drawn up in the English, Pashtu and Urdu languages, all texts being equally authentic. In case of any divergence of interpretation, the English text shall prevail.

Done in five original copies at Geneva this fourteenth day of April 1988.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan)

(more)

Agreement on the Interrelationships for the
Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan

1. The diplomatic process initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations with the support of all Governments concerned and aimed at achieving, through negotiations, a political settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan has been successfully brought to an end.

2. Having agreed to work towards a comprehensive settlement designed to resolve the various issues involved and to establish a framework for good-neighbourliness and co-operation, the Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan entered into negotiations through the intermediary of the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General at Geneva from 16 to 24 June 1982. Following consultations held by the Personal Representative in Islamabad, Kabul and Teheran from 21 January to 7 February 1983, the negotiations continued at Geneva from 11 to 22 April and from 12 to 24 June 1983. The Personal Representative again visited the area for high-level discussions from 3 to 15 April 1984. It was then agreed to change the format of the negotiations and, in pursuance thereof, proximity talks through the intermediary of the Personal Representative were held at Geneva from 24 to 30 August 1984. Another visit to the area by the Personal Representative from 25 to 31 May 1985 preceded further rounds of proximity talks held at Geneva from 20 to 25 June, from 27 to 30 August and from 16 to 19 December 1985. The Personal Representative paid an additional visit to the area from 8 to 18 March 1986 for consultations. The final round of negotiations began as proximity talks at Geneva on 5 May 1986, was suspended on 23 May 1986, and was resumed from 31 July to 8 August 1986. The Personal Representative visited the area from 20 November to 3 December 1986 for further consultations and the talks at Geneva were resumed again from 25 February to 9 March 1987, and from 7 to 11 September 1987. The Personal Representative again visited the area from 18 January to 9 February 1988 and the talks resumed at Geneva from 2 March to 8 April 1988. The format of the negotiations was changed on 14 April 1988, when the instruments comprising the settlement were finalized, and, accordingly, direct talks were held at that stage. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran was kept informed of the progress of the negotiations throughout the diplomatic process.

3. The Government of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan took part in the negotiations with the expressed conviction that they were acting in accordance with their rights and obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and agreed that the political settlement should be based on the following principles of international law:

- + The principle that States shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;
- + The principle that States shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;

(more)

- + The duty not to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of any State, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- + The duty of States to co-operate with one another in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations;
- + The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- + The principle of sovereign equality of States;
- + The principle that States shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

The two Governments further affirmed the right of the Afghan refugees to return to their homeland in a voluntary and unimpeded manner.

4. The following instruments were concluded on this date as component parts of the political settlement:

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention;

A Declaration on International Guarantees by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America;

A Bilateral Agreement between the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan on the Voluntary Return of Refugees;

The present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan.

5. The Bilateral Agreement on the Principles of Mutual Relations, in particular on Non-interference and Non-intervention; the Declaration on International Guarantees; the Bilateral Agreement on the Voluntary Return of Refugees; and the present Agreement on the Interrelationships for the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan will enter into force on 15 May 1988. In accordance with the time-frame agreed upon between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Republic of Afghanistan there will be a phased withdrawal of the foreign troops which will start on the date of entry into force mentioned above. One half of the troops will be withdrawn by 15 August 1988 and the withdrawal of all troops will be completed within nine months.

6. The interrelationships in paragraph 5 above have been agreed upon in order to achieve effectively the purpose of the political settlement, namely, that as from 15 May 1988, there will be no interference and intervention in any form in the affairs of the Parties; the international guarantees will be in operation; the voluntary return of the refugees to their homeland will start and be completed within the timeframe specified in the agreement on the voluntary return of the refugees; and the phased withdrawal of the foreign troops will start and be completed within the time-frame envisaged in paragraph 5. It is therefore essential that all the obligations

(more)

deriving from the instruments concluded as component parts of the settlement be strictly fulfilled and that all the steps required to ensure full compliance with all the provisions of the instruments be completed in good faith.

7. To consider alleged violations and to work out prompt and mutually satisfactory solutions to questions that may arise in the implementation of the instruments comprising the settlement representatives of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall meet whenever required.

A representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. He may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval suggestions and recommendations for prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments.

In order to enable him to fulfil his tasks, the representative shall be assisted by such personnel under his authority as required. On his own initiative, or at the request of any of the Parties, the personnel shall investigate any possible violations of any of the provisions of the instruments and prepare a report thereon. For that purpose, the representative and his personnel shall receive all the necessary co-operation from the Parties, including all freedom of movement within their respective territories required for effective investigation. Any report submitted by the representative to the two Governments shall be considered in a meeting of the Parties no later than forty-eight hours after it has been submitted.

The modalities and logistical arrangements for the work of the representative and the personnel under his authority as agreed upon with the Parties are set out in the Memorandum of Understanding which is annexed to and is part of this Agreement.

8. The present instrument will be registered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. It has been examined by the representatives of the Parties to the bilateral agreements and of the States-Guarantors, who have signified their consent with its provisions. The representatives of the Parties, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have affixed their signatures hereunder. The Secretary-General for the United Nations was present.

Done, at Geneva, this fourteenth day of April 1988, in five original copies each in the English, Pashtu, Russian and Urdu languages, all being equally authentic. In case of any dispute regarding the interpretation the English text shall prevail.

(Signed by Afghanistan and Pakistan)

In witness thereof, the representatives of the States-Guarantors affixed their signatures hereunder:

(Signed by the USSR and USA)

(more)

Annex

Memorandum of Understanding

I. Basic requirements

(a) The Parties will provide full support and co-operation to the Representative of the Secretary-General and to all the personnel assigned to assist him;

(b) The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel will be accorded every facility as well as prompt and effective assistance including freedom of movement and communications, accommodation, transportation and other facilities that may be necessary for the performance of their tasks: Afghanistan and Pakistan undertake to grant to the Representative and his staff all the relevant privileges and immunities provided for by the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations.

(c) Afghanistan and Pakistan will be responsible for the safety of the Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel while operating in their respective countries.

(d) In performing their functions, the Representative of the Secretary-General and his staff will act with complete impartiality. The Representative of the Secretary-General and his personnel must not interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and Pakistan and, in this context, cannot be used to secure advantages for any of the Parties concerned.

II. Mandate

The mandate for the implementation-assistance arrangements envisaged in paragraph 7 derives from the instruments comprising the settlement. All the staff assigned to the Representative of the Secretary-General will accordingly be carefully briefed on the relevant provisions of the instruments and on the procedures that will be used to ascertain violations thereof.

III. Modus operandi and personnel organization

The Secretary-General will appoint a senior military officer as Deputy to the Representative who will be stationed in the area, as head of two small headquarters units, one in Kabul and the other in Islamabad, each comprising five military officers, drawn from existing United Nations operations, and a small civilian auxiliary staff.

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will act on behalf of the Representative and be in contact with the Parties through the Liaison Officer each Party will designate for this purpose.

The two headquarters units will be organized into two Inspection Teams to ascertain on the ground any violation of the instruments comprising the settlement. Whenever considered necessary by the Representative of the Secretary-General or his Deputy, up to 40 additional military officers (some 10 additional Inspection Teams) will be redeployed from existing operations within the shortest possible time (normally around 48 hours).

(more)

The nationalities of all the Officers will be determined in consultation with the Parties.

Whenever necessary the Representative of the Secretary-General, who will periodically visit the area for consultations with the Parties and to review the work of his personnel, will also assign to the area members of his own Office and other civilian personnel from the United Nations Secretariat as may be needed. His Deputy will alternate between the two Headquarters units and will remain at all times in close communication with him.

IV Procedure

(a) Inspections conducted at the request of the Parties

(i) A complaint regarding a violation of the instrument of the settlement lodged by any of the Parties should be submitted in writing, in the English language, to the respective headquarters units and should indicate all relevant information and details.

(ii) Upon receipt of a complaint the Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General will immediately inform the other Party of the complaint and undertake an investigation by making on-site inspections, gathering testimony and using any other procedure which he may deem necessary for the investigation of the alleged violation. Such inspection will be conducted using headquarters staff as referred to above, unless the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General considers that additional teams are needed. In that case, the Parties will, under the principle of freedom of movement, allow immediate access of the additional personnel to their respective territories.

(iii) Reports on investigations will be prepared in English and submitted by the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General to the two Governments, on a confidential basis. (A third copy of the Report will be simultaneously transmitted, on a confidential basis, to United Nations Headquarters in New York, exclusively for the information of the Secretary-General and his Representative.) In accordance with paragraph 7 a report on an investigation should be considered in a meeting of the Parties not later than 48 hours after it has been submitted. The Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will, in the absence of the Representative, lend his good offices to the Parties and in that context he will assist in the organization of the meetings and participate in them. In the context of those meetings the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may submit to the Parties for their consideration and approval, suggestions and recommendations for the prompt, faithful and complete observance of the provisions of the instruments. (Such suggestions and recommendations will be, as a matter of course, consulted with, and cleared by, the Representative of the Secretary-General.)

(more)

(b) Inspections conducted on the initiative of the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General

In addition to inspections requested by the Parties, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General may carry out on his own initiative and in consultation with the Representative inspections he deems appropriate for the purpose of the implementation of paragraph 7. If it is considered that the conclusions reached in an inspection justify a report to the Parties, the same procedure used in submitting reports in connection with inspections carried out at the request of the Parties will be followed.

Level of participation in meetings

As indicated above, the Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General will participate at meetings of the Parties convened for the purpose of considering reports on violations. Should the Parties decide to meet for the purpose outlined in paragraph 7 at a high political level, the Representative of the Secretary-General will personally attend such meetings.

V. Duration

The Deputy to the Representative of the Secretary-General and the other personnel will be established in the area not later than twenty days before the entry into force of the instruments. The arrangements will cease to exist two months after the completion of all time-frames envisaged for the implementation of the instruments.

VI. Financing

The cost of all facilities and services to be provided by the Parties will be borne by the respective Governments. The salaries and travel expenses of the personnel to and from the area, as well as the costs of the local personnel assigned to the headquarters units, will be defrayed by the United Nations.

SG/SM/4120
SG/1862
14 April 1988

CONCLUDING REMARKS BY SECRETARY-GENERAL AT SIGNING CEREMONY FOR AGREEMENTS
ON SETTLEMENT OF SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

Following is the text of the concluding remarks of Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, delivered today at the Palais de Nations in Geneva, at the signing ceremony of the Agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan:

The documents which have just been signed constitute a most significant achievement.

They represent a major stride in the effort to bring peace to Afghanistan and assure reprieve for its people. The challenge facing the people of Afghanistan is great, but it can and must be met by them alone. The Agreements lay the basis for the exercise by all Afghans of their right to self-determination, a principle enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.

I am confident that the signatories of these Agreements will abide fully by the letter and spirit of the texts and that they will implement them in good faith -- for the sake of all the people of Afghanistan and for the wider objective of peace in the region and the world.

I have held a deep personal commitment to a peaceful solution of the situation relating to Afghanistan since the day, over seven years ago, when, as Personal Representative of my predecessor, I participated in laying the groundwork for the Agreements that have been signed today. I wish, at this stage, to express my warm appreciation to my Personal Representative, Mr. Diego Cordovez, for his skillful and patient endeavours as well as to the other members of the United Nations team.

The ceremony today is indeed a testimony to the capacity of the United Nations to attain positive results on the most complex of issues when backed by the political will of its Member States.

In closing, I wish to assure the people of Afghanistan that the United Nations and the international community stand ready to assist them, in this critical moment of their history, in meeting the serious humanitarian and economic needs of their country.

SG/SM/4119
SG/1861
14 April 1986

SECRETARY-GENERAL'S OPENING REMARKS AT SIGNING CEREMONY FOR AGREEMENTS
ON SETTLEMENT OF SITUATION RELATING TO AFGHANISTAN

Following is the text of the opening remarks of Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar, delivered today at the Palais de Nations in Geneva, at the signing ceremony of the Agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan:

I wish to welcome you to the United Nations Office in Geneva for the signing ceremony of the Agreements on the settlement of the situation relating to Afghanistan.

May I express my appreciation to Foreign Minister Wakil, of the Republic of Afghanistan, and to Minister of State Noorani, of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, for their tireless efforts. May I also express my appreciation to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and Secretary of State Shultz of the United States of America, for their Governments' readiness to become guarantors for these Agreements. I wish now to invite them to proceed with the signing of the documents.

* * * * *

CITIZENS COMMISSION ON AFGHAN REFUGEES

Mr. Alain Boinet^{*/}
Solidarite Afghanistan
3 Impasse Royer Collarb
75005 Paris
FRANCE

Mr. Patrick Brizay^{*/}
Solidarite Afghanistan
3 Impasse Royer Collarb
75005 Paris
FRANCE

Mr. Leo Cherne
Chairman
International Rescue Committee
386 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10016

The Honorable Robert Cranborne^{*/}
Chairman, Afghan Aid
#2 Swan Walk
London 3W3, ENGLAND

Professor Louis Dupree
Visiting Professor
Duke University and the University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Islamic and Arabian Development Studies
2114 Campus Drive
Durham, North Carolina 27706

^{*/} Participants in the May 28-June 8, 1988 Fact-Finding Visit. Mr. Boinet was present for the Geneva portion of the trip only; Mr. Brizay was present for the Pakistan portion only.

Ms. Nancy Hatch Dupree
Program Associate
Islamic and Arabian Development Studies
Duke University
2114 Campus Drive
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina 27706

The Honorable Theodore Eliot
Former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
5850 Grove Street
Sanoma, California 95476

Professor Thomas Gouttierre^{*/}
Dean, International Studies and Programs
Director of the Center for Afghanistan Studies
University of Nebraska
60th & Dodge Streets, Room 238
Omaha, Nebraska 68182

The Rev. Theodore Hesburgh
President Emeritus
Notre Dame University
Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

Mr. Lionel H. Olmer^{*/}
Former Undersecretary of Commerce
for International Trade
1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1300
Washington, D.C. 20036

Ms. Catherine O'Neill^{*/}
Director of Public Affairs
International Harold Tribune
181 Avenue Charles de Gaulle
95251 Neuilly Cedex
FRANCE

Mr. Thomas L. Rhodes^{*/}
Partner
Goldman, Sachs & Co.
85 Broad Street
New York, New York 10004

James C. Strickler, M.D.*/
Professor of Medicine
Department of Community and
Family Medicine
Dartmouth Medical School
Hanover, New Hampshire 03756

Ms. Liv Ullmann
UNICEF Ambassador-at-Large
15 West 81st Street
New York, New York 10024

The Honorable Simone Veil
Member of the European Parliament
97-113, rue Belliard
Brussels 104
BELGIUM

Mr. Elie Wiesel
Boston University
745 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, Massachusetts 02215

Mr. H. Roy Williams
Deputy Director for Operations
International Rescue Committee
386 Park Avenue South
New York, New York 10016

Mr. Derick P. Berlage
1615 L Street, N.W., Suite 1300
Washington, D.C. 20036

APPENDIX 4

COMMUNICABLE DISEASE CENTER STUDY OF REFUGEE HEALTHSelected Cases of Child Mortality
1985-86

<u>Disease</u> <u>problem</u>	<u>Ages</u>			
	<u>0-30</u> <u>Days</u> No. (%)	<u>1-11</u> <u>Months</u> No. (%)	<u>1-4</u> <u>Years</u> No. (%)	<u>All</u> <u>ages</u> No. (%)
Tetanus	9 (36)	0 -	0 -	9 (13)
Measles	0 -	3 (12)	0 -	3 (4)
Diarrhea	1 (4)	12 (46)	11 (55)	24 (34)
Malaria	0 -	1 (4)	0 (0)	1 (1)
Unknown	15 (60)	10 (38)	9 (45)	34 (48)
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
TOTAL	25 (100)	26 (100)	20 (100)	71 (100)

SELECTED REFUGEE HEALTH STATISTICS
January-March 1988

Reported Cases

	<u>Men</u>	<u>Women</u>	<u>Children</u> (0-4)	<u>Children</u> (5-14)	<u>Total</u>
Upper Respiratory Infection	3,253	4,174	6,738	5,723	19,888
Bronchitis	2,265	2,987	4,358	2,517	12,127
TB Suspected	365	580	355	339	1,909
TB Confirmed	1,175	2,106	590	513	4,384
Malaria Suspected	525	595	511	798	2,429
Malaria Confirmed	119	144	134	205	602

Source: International Rescue Committee
Basic Health Unit Statistics

CONTRIBUTIONS PLEDGED AT DONOR'S MEETING
SPONSORED BY U.N. COORDINATOR SADRUDDIN
June 14, 1988

<u>Country</u>	<u>Amount</u>
United States	\$119.0 million ^{*/}
Canada	60.0 million
Norway	10.3 million
Sweden	6.6 million
Japan	5.0 million
Netherlands	2.5 million
Denmark	1.8 million
Switzerland	1.4 million
Finland	1.1 million

NOTES:

1. These contributions were announced at a June 14, 1988 donor's meeting sponsored by the Coordinator for United Nations Humanitarian and Economic Assistance relating to Afghanistan. Not all of the funds will be channeled through U.N.-sponsored programs. Representatives of each of these countries indicated that these were initial contributions which would be augmented by future donations as the resettlement process gets underway.

^{*/} This figure represents amounts previously appropriated for humanitarian assistance for Afghan refugees in Fiscal Year 1988. It includes \$49 million in contributions to UNHCR and WFP, and \$70 million for bilateral programs. The U.S. has not pledged additional funding in response to the U.N. Coordinator's appeal.

2. Other countries represented at the meeting pledged their support for the resettlement effort and indicated that the details of their assistance would be forthcoming. These include Austria, Czechoslovakia, the EC, Federal Republic of Germany, France, German Democratic Republic, Italy, Saudi Arabia, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. While the U.K. representative did not disclose a specific aid figure at the meeting, earlier reports indicated that the British have pledged \$19 million for humanitarian aid during resettlement.